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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RONALD DRAUGHON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 870174

v.
CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE
SOCIETY,
Defendant-Respondent.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the
Court by Utah Code Anno. § 78-2-2(3)(i)(1986).
The

pertinent

proceedings

below

include

only

the

parties' cross motions for summary judgment heard before the
Honorable

Douglas

L. Cornaby on March

31, 1987.

Cornaby took the Motions under advisement

Judge

and entered a

written ruling on April 9, 1987, granting defendant's Motion
for

Summary

Judgment

and

denying

plaintiff's

Motion

Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
I.

Whether Judge Cornaby erred in not finding the

meaning of the phrase "material contributing cause"
ambiguous.
II.

Whether Judge Cornaby erred in applying an
1

for

Oregon

judicial

interpretation

of

the

phrase

"material contributing cause" to the facts of the
case.
III.

Whether,

if

the

Oregon

judicial

interpretation is applicable, Judge Cornaby erred
in

his

construction

and

application

of

that

interpretation.
IV.

Whether Judge Cornaby erred in concluding

that, as a matter of law, Sandra Draughon's kidney
disease was a "material contributing cause" of her
death.
V.

Whether Judge Cornaby erred

in effectively

rewriting the contract of the parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October of 1985, Ronald Draughon and his wife, Sandra
Draughon, entered

into a loan agreement under which they

borrowed funds from America First Credit Union to purchase an
automobile.

Pursuant to the loan agreement, America First

Credit Union obtained credit life insurance from defendant
CUNA Mutual Insurance Society ("CUNA") for the benefit of Mr.
and Mrs. Draughon.
Mrs.

Draughon

diagnosed in 1982.

suffered

from

kidney

disease

first

Although her condition was successfully

treated with maintenance hemodialysis, in November of 1985
2

Mrs.

Draughon

operation.

elected

The

to

operation

undergo
was

a

kidney

successfully

transplant

performed

on

November 21, 1985.
Mrs. Draughon soon developed acute pancreatitis, a rare
and

unforeseen

treatment

she

pancreatitis

complication
received

caused

of

following

internal

the

immunosuppressive

the

operation.

abdominal

infections

The
and,

eventually, cardiac arrest leading to Mrs. Draughon's death.
A claim was submitted to CUNA and denied based on CUNA's
assertion that Mrs. Draughon's death came under the "risks
not assumed" clause. Disputing CUNA's reading of the clause,
on June 13, 1986, Mr. Draughon filed suit in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Davis County seeking a judgment
construing the "risks not assumed" clause in his favor and
requiring CUNA to pay the claim submitted.
On March 31, 1987, both Mr. Draughon and CUNA brought
summary judgment motions for hearing before the Honorable
Douglas L. Cornaby.

In a written Ruling dated April 9, 1987,

Judge Cornaby denied Mr. Draughon's Motion and granted CUNA's
Motion concluding that no issues of material fact existed,
that

the

phrase

"material

contributing

cause" should be

interpreted in accordance with a 1986 Court of Appeals of
Oregon

case,

that

in

light

of this

interpretation Mrs.

Draughon#s kidney disease was a "material contributing cause"
3

of her death and that, therefore, Mr. Draughon's claim was
properly denied.

Judgment in favor of defendant was entered

on May 5, 1987.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about October 29, 1985, plaintiff Ron Draughon and
his wife Sandra Draughon entered into a loan agreement under
which they borrowed funds to purchase an automobile through
America

First

Credit

of Ogden.1

Union

As part

of the

transaction, America First Credit Union obtained credit life
insurance from defendant CUNA for the benefit of Mr. and Mrs.
Draughon.2

Subject to certain conditions and exclusions, the

credit life insurance contract obligated CUNA to pay the
balance due on the auto loan in the event of Mr. or Mrs.
Draughon's death.
Mrs.
diagnosed

Draughon
in

suffered

September

of

from
1982.

kidney
Her

disease
condition

first
was

successfully treated with maintenance hemodialysis, and she
led

a

normal,

productive

life.3

She

employment while raising two young children.

maintained

full

Continuing the

hemodialysis treatments, she was expected to live another
1

Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 1 (R. 87).

3

Id.
4

twenty to thirty years.4
In November of 1985, Mrs. Draughon elected to undergo a
kidney transplant operation.
performed

on November

The operation was successfully

21, 1985.5

Soon thereafter, Mrs.

Draughon developed acute pancreatitis, a rare and unforeseen
complication of the immunosuppressive drugs she was given to
help prevent

rejection of the transplanted

organ.6

The

immunosuppressive drugs caused inflammation and hemorrhaging
of the pancreas which led to internal abdominal infection,
cardiac

arrest

and Mrs. Draughon's death on February 7,

1986.7

As stated by her physician Dr. Wayne Border, "in no

sense was the cause of [her] death related to her underlying
renal [kidney] disease."8
Soon after Mrs. Draughon's death, Mr. Draughon submitted
the claim under the credit life insurance contract.

CUNA

denied the claim based on its assertion that the "risks not
assumed" clause of the contract applied to Mrs. Draughon's
4

Deposition Transcript of Wayne A. Border, M.D. at 31.

5

Affidavit of Dr. Wayne A. Border % 6 (R. 16).

6

Deposition Transcript of Wayne A. Border, M.D. at 28.

7

Id. at 27.

8

Deposition Transcript
Deposition Exhibit 2, at 2.

of

5

Wayne

A.

Border, M.D.,

death.9

In relevant part, the clause reads:
CUNA Mutual does not assume the risk and
no benefit is provided for any loss if
any material contributing cause of loss
was from sickness or injury which first
became manifest prior to the time
insurance
coverage was
otherwise
effective under the contract.10

Specifically,

CUNA

contended

that Mrs. Draughon's

kidney

disease, admittedly manifest prior to the effective date of
the contract, was a "material contributing cause" of her
death.
Prior to Judge Cornaby's April 9, 1987 Ruling disposing
of

this

matter,

the

meaning

of

the

phrase

"material

contributing cause" was addressed by no Court other than the
Courts of the State of Oregon.
applied

in a specific

In Oregon, the phrase is

factual context

workers compensation disputes.

common

to certain

The phrase is not defined in

the insurance contract in which it is found and Judge Cornaby
did not define it in his April 9 Ruling.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Resolution

of

this

matter

involved

two

tasks:

interpretation of the phrase "material contributing cause,"
(hereinafter

sometimes

referred

to

as

"the phrase")

application of that interpretation to the facts.
9

10

and

In carrying

Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (R« 88).
Id.
6

out these tasks, Judge Cornaby erred in several respects.
First,
contract,

the

has

judicial

phrase

no

is

not

ordinary

interpretation.

defined

meaning

and

Therefore,

in the
lacks

insurance
a relevant

it should have been

found ambiguous and construed strictly against CUNA.

Mr.

Draughon presented a construction favorable to his position
and urged Judge Cornaby to adopt it.

Judge Cornaby erred in

failing to do so.
Second, the only judicial interpretation of the phrase,
that of the courts of Oregon, was developed and is applied in
a legal and factual context incompatible with those of the
present matter.

For that reason, and because the parties did

not intend to be bound by the Oregon interpretation, it is
inapplicable.

Judge

Cornaby's

reliance

on

the

Oregon

of

the

Oregon

interpretation was, therefore, error.
Finally,

assuming

the

applicability

interpretation, Mrs. Draughon#s kidney disease was not a
"material

contributing

interpretation.

cause"

In reaching

of
the

her

death

opposite

under

that

result, Judge

Cornaby overlooked the key element of proof required by the
Oregon courts to establish "material contributing cause,"
medical

causal

injuries.

link between

the

original

and

a

subsequent

Therefore, although ostensibly applying the Oregon

interpretation of the phrase, Judge Cornaby misconstrued that
7

interpretation and, in doing so, committed error.
ARGUMENT
The review standard applicable to this appeal was set
forth in Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc., v. Service
Auto Parts. Inc.. 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979).

In Automotive

Manufacturers the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of plaintiff based on its interpretation of certain
language found in a security agreement.
error to the trial court's interpretation.

Defendant assigned
Upon review, this

court stated:
The narrow question we are called upon to
answer is whether by co-signing a
security agreement with the provisions as
indicated supra, one becomes a guarantor
of the principle.
We must, therefore,
interpret the language of the documents
drafted by plaintiff and signed by the
parties in 197 2.
Where the issue
involved is solely one of law, as in the
instant case, this court is capable of
determining the question as was the trial
court and we are not bound by its
conclusions.
Id. at 1036.
Likewise, the central issue involved in this appeal is
solely one of law.
an

insurance

The court must interpret the language of

policy

drafted

by

CUNA.

Judge

Cornaby's

conclusions are not binding and, as argued below, should be
given no deference.

8

POINT I
THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF
THE
PHRASE
"MATERIAL
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE" EMPLOYS
PROXIMATE CAUSE PRINCIPLES.
Resolution

of

this

matter

involves,

first,

the

interpretation of the phrase "material contributing cause."
The phrase appears in an exclusionary clause of the insurance
contract of the parties.

As noted above, the clause reads:

CUNA Mutual does not assume the risk and
no benefit is provided for any loss if
any material contributing cause of loss
was from sickness or injury which first
became manifest prior to the time
insurance
coverage was
otherwise
effective under the contract.11
In rejecting Mr. Draughon's claim, CUNA stated that Mrs.
Draughon's kidney disease, first manifest prior to coverage,
was a "material contributing cause" of her death.
A«

The Phrase Should be Defined Employing Proximate Cause
Principles.
Mr. Draughon argued below, and urges on appeal, that the

phrase "material contributing cause" should be interpreted
and applied employing proximate cause principles.

Several

reasons exist for equating "material contributing cause" with
proximate cause.

First, the only judicial interpretations of

the phrase "material contributing cause," those of the courts

Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (R. 88).

of Oregon, define and apply it employing terminology and
concepts borrowed from the doctrine of proximate cause.12
Second, the doctrine is the standard for determining cause
most

familiar

to

the

judiciary.

Finally,

the

use

of

proximate cause as the equivalent of "material contributing
cause"

will

allow

this

court

to

apply

the

objective,

conceptual parameters it developed to determine proximate
cause.

Use of the "material contributing cause" standard

will suffer from the lack of such an objective, conceptual
basis for decision.
B.

Equating "Material Contributing Cause" with Proximate
Cause. Kidney Disease was not a "Material Contributing
Cause" of Mrs. Draughon/s Death.
To restate, the central issue is whether Mrs. Draughon's

kidney disease, her only sickness or injury manifest prior to
coverage, was a "material contributing cause" of her death.
Employing

proximate

cause

principles,

the

issue

becomes

whether Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was a cause "which in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces [her death] and without which the

12

In the context of worker's compensation claims, an
older, compensated injury is a "material contributing cause"
of a present condition only if there is no "intervening and
superceding cause of [the present] condition."
Manous v.
Argonaut Insurance. 79 Or. App. 645, 719 P.2d 1318, 1320
(1986).
See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment against CUNA Mutual Insurance Society at 4 (R.21).
10

result would not have occurred •"."13

Examining each part of

the test individually, it is apparent that the issue should
be decided in favor of Mr. Draughon.
First, to be a proximate cause (and by interpretation, a
"material
disease

contributing

must

cause"),

have produced

her

Mrs.
death

Draughon's

kidney

in a natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause.

The sequence of events that actually occurred from

the time Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was first diagnosed
until her death were not natural, continuous or unbroken.
Whether one defines "natural" in terms of probability or in
terms of foreseeability, the pancreatitis that caused Mrs.
Draughon's death was not a part of the "natural" sequence
because, as both the doctors for Mr. Draughon and CUNA agree,
it was an improbable, not reasonably foreseeable complication
of her transplantation.14
That the sequence of events was not "continuous" but was
in

fact

"broken"

is apparent.

The prognosis

for Mrs.

Draughon's kidney disease prior to her election to undergo a
transplantation

was

good.

Continuing

her

hemodialysis

treatments, she was expected to live another twenty to thirty
13

Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 245
(Utah 1985).
14

See Affidavit of Dr. Wayne A. Border at 2 (R.16),
and Affidavit of Dr. Robert E. Bond at 2 (R.49).
11

years.15

Mrs.

Draughon's

election

to

undergo

a

transplantation not only interrupted but completely ended the
natural and continuous progression of her kidney disease.
Finally, an efficient intervening cause, in fact that
the sole cause, as agreed by both doctors for Mr. Draughon
and

CUNA, broke

existed.

any " chain of causation77 that may have

The efficient cause is "one that necessarily sets

in operation the factors that accomplish the injury."16
Border,

Mrs.

Draughon7 s

physician,

explained

how

Dr.
her

pancreatitis developed and set in operation the factors that
led to her death:
In my view the initial event would have
been the damage to the pancreas by the
steroid, the prednisone drug she was
taking, and that caused pancreatitis;
that is, inflammation of the pancreas;
the pancreas cells now begin to leak
their contents, which are enzymes, which
are like acid, they begin to eat other
tissues, and the pancreas literally
begins to dissolve itself, and that7s the
condition we call acute pancreatitis that
is associated with nausea, vomiting, back
pain and other conditions.
Now, that can be reversible, or if it
progresses, as in her case, the release
of these harmful substances from the
pancreas continues to literally dissolve
the pancreas and then begins to erode
through these tissues, and then it begins
15

Deposition transcript of Wayne A. Border, M.D., at

16

Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d at 245.

31.

12

to hemorrhage, so that suddenly the whole
pancreas has turned into a huge area of
dead and hemorrhagic tissues, and now
that becomes infected so that we now are
back--we've now gone back to the
infections that she has.
The retroperitoneal hemorrhage is the
dissection of the blood and the
pancreatic contents into other parts of
the back; the areas surrounding the
pancreas; and now you have a life
threatening condition, and the—obviously
the low blood pressure and the metabolic
acidosis are all terminal events
resulting in cardiac arrest.17
Dr. Border's description of the terminal sequence of
events makes
Draughon's

apparent

death

that

the efficient

was her pancreatitis.

cause of Mrs.
Therefore, Mrs.

Draughon's kidney disease cannot be termed a proximate cause
of her death.
Insurance

Instead,

refers

circumstance."

to

as

it is an event that Couch on
an

"antecedent

contributing

Section 74.717 states:

An antecedent contributing circumstance
is generally ignored in determining the
proximate cause.
That is to say, a
situation which merely sets the stage for
the later event is not regarded as being
the proximate cause merely because it
made possible the subsequent loss. For
example, the explosion of gas, and not
the lighting of a match, is the proximate
cause of loss where the explosion is
caused by the lightinq of a match in a
room filled with gas.18^
Deposition transcript of Dr. Wayne A. Border at 31.
Couch on Insurance 2d at 1024 (Rev. ed.).
13

Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease and transplantation were
events or circumstances that "merely set the stage" for the
later terminal events identified by Dr. Border.

The kidney

disease in particular, the only "sickness or injury which
first became manifest prior to the time insurance coverage
was otherwise effective under the contract,"19 was not a
proximate

cause

and, by

interpretation, not

contributing cause" of her death.

a

"material

Plaintiff assigns error to

Judge Cornaby's failure to so hold.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE
"MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE."
Resolution of the ultimate issue below, whether Sandra
Draughon/s kidney disease was a "material contributing cause"
of her death, required Judge Cornaby to first define the
phrase "material contributing cause." The difficulty of this
task was compounded by three factors: the phrase is not
defined in the insurance contract in which it appears, it has
no "usual and ordinarily accepted meaning"20 and it is not
defined in any relevant case law.
Despite these factors, Judge Cornaby did not find the
19

Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (R. 88).

20

Beraera v. Ideal National Life Insurance Co. , 524
P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1974).
14

phrase

ambiguous.

Instead,

he

looked

to

the

judicial

interpretation given the phrase by the courts of the State of
Oregon, determined that that interpretation is relevant and
applied the interpretation to the facts of this case.21
doing so, he committed two errors.

First, he erred in not

finding the phrase ambiguous at the outset.
in

his

determination

that

the

In

Oregon

Second, he erred

interpretation

is

relevant and applicable.
A.

"Material Contributing
Inherently Ambiguous.

Cause."

as

a

Phrase,

is

In Auto Leasing Company v. Central Mutual Insurance Co.,
7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264 (1958), this court established
the following as the test for ambiguity

in an insurance

policy provision:
The test to be applied is: would the
meaning be plain to a person of ordinary
intelligence and understanding, viewing
the matter fairly and reasonably, in
accordance with the usual and natural
meaning of the words, and in light of the
existing circumstances, including the
purpose of the policy.22
As applied to the phrase at issue, the test indicates
ambiguity for several reasons.

21

First, because "reasonable

Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3 (R. 88-

89) .
22

Auto Leasing Company v. Central Mutual Insurance
Co., 325 P.2d at 266.
15

minds may differ as to the meaning"23 of the phrase, by
definition

its meaning

cannot be "plain to a person of

ordinary intelligence,"

The problem stems from the use of

the word "material." Webster's Dictionary defines "material"
as

"having

real

importance

or

great

consequences."24

Applying this definition, one notes that the phrase embodies
a

subjective

value

determination.

The

question

becomes

whether Sandra Draughon's kidney disease was an "important"
contributing

cause

of

her

death,

a

question

on

which

reasonable minds may differ.
For example, one might argue, as does Mr. Draughon, that
Mrs.

Draughon's

kidney

disease

was

not

an

important

contributing cause of her death because there is no medical
causal connection between her kidney disease and her death.
On the other hand, one might argue, as does CUNA, that Mrs.
Draughon's kidney disease was an important contributing cause
of her death because but for her kidney disease she would not
have experienced the events that led to her death.

In other

words, the meaning of the phrase and its application to the
facts

is

dependent

on

the

subjective

determination

importance made by the person analyzing the issue.

of

It is

this subjective element that prevents the meaning of the
23

Id.

24

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (5th Ed. 1977).
16

phrase

from being

"plain" to the hypothetical, objective

"person of ordinary intelligence."25
In addition, the unqualified use of the word "cause"
complicates the meaning of the phrase.

Webster's Dictionary

defines "cause" as "something that brings about a result."26
In the context of the insurance contract, the use of the word
without qualification raises the question of whether "cause"
means anything that brings about a result or whether it
refers only to medical or physiological factors that bring
about a result.

Arguably, the language of the exclusionary

provision contemplates that "cause" includes only medical
factors.27

That there is room for argument, however, points

out the ambiguous nature of the phrase and the futility of
trying to determine its "plain" meaning.
In short, the Auto Leasing Company test exposes the
25

Aside from the additional ambiguity the subjective
element supplies, it is objectionable because coverage under
the insurance contract should not depend on defendant's
subjective determination of materiality. Finding the phrase
ambiguous and construing it in favor of plaintiff should
cause defendant to rewrite its exclusionary provision to
provide objective parameters within which claims such as
plaintiff's can be properly assessed.
26

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (5th Ed. 1977).

27

The exclusionary provision provides: "No benefit is
provided for any loss if any material contributing cause of
loss was from sickness or injury which first became manifest
. . . ." See Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (R.
88).
17

essential ambiguity of the phrase at issue.

A reasonable,

objective person of ordinary intelligence would not say that
its meaning is "plain."

Accordingly, the phrase should have

been construed strictly against the insurer, CUNA.

As stated

by this Court:
In interpreting insurance policies, we
have held that ambiguities are to be
construed against the insurer and that
words are to be given their ordinary
meaning. An insured is entitled to the
broadest protection he could have
reasonably understood to be provided by
the policy.28
Judge Cornaby erred in failing to recognize the aiabiguity and
construe the phrase against CUNA.
B.

The Oregon Interpretation of the Phrase is Inapplicable.
Judge Cornaby ostensibly applied a Court of Appeals of

Oregon interpretation of the phrase to arrive at his decision
in the present matter.29
is

erroneous

for

two

Application of this interpretation
reasons.

First,

the

Oregon

interpretation is irrelevant in the present context..

The

Oregon courts have developed the phrase and its body of
defining principles as a judicial elucidation of certain

z

*> Fuller v. Director of Finance. 694 P.2d 1045 (Utah
1985).
29

See Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (Re

88) .
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language found in an Oregon workers' compensation statute.JU
The

Oregon

interpretation, therefore, is colored

by the

statutory context in which it developed and the peculiar
facts of the workers' compensation claims in which it arose.
Specifically, the phrase is applied by the Oregon Courts
only when a certain set of facts give rise to a claim under
Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.273(1).31

Those facts are:

(1) a

claimant has suffered an off-the-job injury (2) that operates
to aggravate an earlier, compensated on-the-job injury (3) to
the same part of the body.32

When these particular facts are

present, the issue is whether the earlier, compensated injury
is a "material contributing

cause" of the aggravation.33

Even assuming the relevancy of the Oregon interpretation
in an abstract sense, the facts of this case do not fit the
pattern that triggers the Oregon application of the phrase.
30

See Taafe v. SAIF, 77 Or. App. 492, 713 P.2d 680
(1986); Grable v. Weyerhauser Co., 291 Or. 387, 631 P.2d 768
(1981); Peterson v. Eugene F. Burrill Lumber, 294 Or. 537,
660 P.2d 1058 (1983). The relevant statute, Or. Rev. Stat. §
656.273(1), provides: "After the last award or arrangement
of compensation, an injured worker is entitled to additional
compensation, including medical services, for worsened
conditions resulting from the original injury."
31

See Footnote 30.

32

See Grable, 291 Or. at 400-01, 631 P.2d at 776; also
see Manous v. Argonaut Insurance, 79 Or. App. 645, 719 P.2d
1318 (1986).
33

Id.
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Mrs. Draughon's death did not result from an aggravation of
her kidney disease, nor did it result from injury to the same
part of the body as that injured by the kidney disease.

In

short,

is

the

Oregon

interpretation

of

the

phrase

inapplicable.
Second, the application of the Oregon interpretation was
erroneous because the parties did not intend that the phrase
be given such an interpretation.

In Union Pacific Railroad

Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910
(1965), this court stated that "in resolving a dispute about
the interpretation of provisions in a contract the objective
is to determine what the parties intended at the time it was
executed."34

Judge Cornaby failed to meet this objective.

Instead, he used, without alteration or qualification, an
interpretation of the phrase that neither party contemplated.
In

applying

the

contextually

incongruous

Oregon

interpretation, and in doing so without consideration for the
intentions of the parties, Judge Cornaby committed error.

34

Union Pacific Railroad Co. , v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co.. 408 P.2d at 913.
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POINT III
IF THE OREGON INTERPRETATION OF
THE
PHRASE
" MATERIAL
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE" IS PROPERLY
CONSTRUED AND APPLIED TO THE
PRESENT FACTS, MRS. DRAUGHON'S
KIDNEY DISEASE WAS NOT A
"MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE"
OF HER DEATH.
Notwithstanding

the

inapplicability

of

the

Oregon

interpretation, if properly construed and applied it would
have yielded a result in favor of Mr. Draughon.

Simply put,

this is because under the Oregon interpretation proof of
"material
cause,

contributing

and

there

is

cause"
no

requires

evidence

proof

of

a

of

medical

medical

causal

connection between Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease and her
death.
The causal connection that does exist, a simple "but
for" relation, served as a basis for Judge Cornaby's ruling
that

Mrs.

contributing

Draughon 's
cause"

of

kidney
her

disease

death.

was

a

Therefore,

"material
although

ostensibly applying the Oregon interpretation, Judge Cornaby
reached a result opposite of what should have been reached
under that interpretation.
Judge Cornaby's analysis of the Oregon interpretation of
the phrase, and his application of that interpretation to the
facts of the case consists entirely of the following:
This phrase has not been interpreted by a
21

Utah court before and there is little
precedent in other jurisdictions on this
exact issue. The Appeals Court of Oregon
addressed the issue in Manous vs.
Argonaut Insurance, 79 Or. App. 645, 719
P.2d 1318 (1986). This case interpreted
the phrase "material contributing cause"
in
light
of Oregon's
workmen's
compensation law.
Under this law, the
employee has the burden of proving that
an original injury is a "material
contributing cause" of a present
compensable injury.
The court stated
that "a compensable injury need not be
the sole or principle cause of clciimant's
worsened condition," it need only be a
material cause. id. at 1320. Although
other intervening forces act upon the
original
condition, the
original
condition is a material contributing
factor of the final injury.
Applying this interpretation to the
present facts, kidney disease was a
"material contributing cause" of Mrs.
Draughon's death. If not for her kidney
disease, Mrs. Draughon would not have
elected to undergo a kidney transplant.
If she had not had the kidney transplant,
she would not have been given steroid
drugs which caused acute pancreatitis,
which ultimately caused her death. The
original condition was kidney disease,
which was a material factor in causing
her death.35
This

"but

misconstruction

for"
and

causation

analysis

misapplication

interpretation of the phrase.

of

amounts
the

to

a

Oregon

Both the misconstruction and

misapplication were prejudicial to plaintiff's case because

35

Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3 (R. 88-

89) .
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they served as the basis upon which Judge Cornaby ruled
against plaintiff.36
A.

Oregon Interpretation.
The essential feature of the Oregon interpretation of

the phrase overlooked by Judge Cornaby is that under the
Oregon interpretation, satisfaction of the causation element
requires

proof

original,

of

medical

compensated

cause.

injury

can

In
only

other
be

a

words, an
"material

contributing cause" of a subsequent off-the-job injury if a
medical causal connection exists between the two.

Thus, in

Christensen v. State Accident Insurance Fund. 27 Or. App.
595, 557 P.2d 48 (1976), the court stated:

"The issue in

cases involving the range of compensable consequences flowing
from a primary injury is nearly exclusively the medical issue
of causal connection between the primary

injury and the

subsequent medical complications."37
This feature of the Oregon interpretation is illustrated
by

the
36

Oregon

courts' reliance

on medical

testimony

to

Id. at 3 (R. 89).

37

Id. at 50. Note that in Grable v. Weverhauser. 291
Or. 387, 631 P.2d 768 (1981), one party argued that because
the Christensen court did not use the phrase "material
contributing cause" in its decision, it had adopted a rule of
law that conflicted with earlier cases applying the "material
contributing cause" standard.
In dismissing the argument,
the Grable court explained the apparent inconsistency and
showed that, in effect, the Christensen court did apply the
"material contributing cause" standard. 631 P.2d at 776.
23

establish ''material contributing cause."

For example, in

Coddinaton v. SAIF. 68 Or. App. 439, 681 P.2d 799 (1984), the
court concluded with the following statement:

"We find from

the medical testimony that the January/ 1981, incident was a
material contributing cause of the herniation."38
the court in Christensen concluded:

Likewise,

"We think that in this

case the claimant has produced the requisite medical evidence
sufficient to establish the causal connection between his
present condition and the 1972 injury."39

It is the medical

causal connection, shown through evidence of physiological
cause and effect, that establishes "material contributing
cause" under the Oregon interpretation.
Likewise, the lack of a medical causal connection, shown
through

evidence

of

no

physiological

cause

and

effect,

requires a finding of no "material contributing cause" under
the Oregon interpretation.

Thus, as noted above, Dr. Border

identified the administration of steroid drugs as the first
link in the physiological chain of causation leading to Mrs.
Draughon's death.40

The kidney disease and transplantation

were events or circumstances that set the stage for the later
38
39

681 P.2d at 802.

557 P.2d at 50;
719 P.2d 1318 (1986).
40

See also Manous, 79 Or. App. 645,

See argument at 12, supra.
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terminal events, but otherwise lack a causal connection to
those events.

Accordingly, under the Oregon interpretation

of the phrase, the interpretation ostensibly applied by Judge
Cornaby, Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was not a "material
contributing cause" of her death.
B.

Judge Cornaby#s Construction and Application.
In

his

interpretation

construction
of

the

and

application

phrase,

Judge

recognize the medical causation element.
Cornaby, Mrs. Draughon's kidney

of

the

Cornaby

Oregon

failed

to

According to Judge

disease was

a

"material

contributing cause" of her death because of the following
"but for" causation sequence:
If not for her kidney disease, Mrs.
Draughon would not have elected to
undergo a kidney transplant. If she had
not had the kidney transplant, she would
not have been given steroid drugs which
caused
acute pancreatitis, which
ultimately caused her death.41
According to the Oregon interpretation, the first two
events of the sequence noted by Judge Cornaby could not be
material contributing causes of death because they lack the
necessary

causal

connection.

Taking

the

parts

sequence one at a time, Judge Cornaby first states:
41

of

the

"If not

Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 (R. 89) .
Interestingly, only upon reaching the third "link" in his
sequence - "steroid drugs which caused acute pancreatitis"does Judge Cornaby begin to use the word "cause" in his
description of the sequence.
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for her kidney disease, Mrs. Draughon would not have elected
to undergo a kidney transplant.//42
indicated

causal

connection,

no

There is no medically
physiological

cause

and

effect relation, between Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease and
her decision to have a transplantation.

Her kidney disease

did not operate physiologically to cause her decision to have
a

transplantation.43

independent

act

Her

of

decision

volition.

was

The

caused

causal

by

an

connection

identified by Judge Cornaby, a simple "but for" relation, is
insufficient to establish "material contributing cause" under
the Oregon interpretation.
The second part of Judge Cornaby's sequence suffers from
the

same

problem

physiological
states:

-

cause

a

factor

produces

other

than

the effect.

Judge

active
Cornaby

"If she had not had the kidney transplant, she would

not have been given steroid drugs . . . ."44
for"

an

causal

however,

relation

to

say

administration
recognized

by

that
of

the

is

apparent.

the

steroid
Oregon

It

Again, the "but
is nonsensical,

transplantation

"caused"

drugs

causal

courts

in
as

the
that

the
sense

necessary

to

establish "material contributing cause."
42
43
44

^
Affidavit of Dr. Wayne A. Border f 9 (R. 28).
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 (R. 89).
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That Judge Cornaby did not recognize the lack of a
physiological cause and effect relation in the present matter
is somewhat confusing

in light of the fact that he did

recognize the relation in the following supposed analogies:
"As a practical matter, patients do not die from their
underlying illness; arteriosclerosis victims die of cardiac
arrest and AIDS victims die of pneumonia, yet in those cases,
the

common

perception

underlying disease."45

of

the

resulting

death

is

the

In other words, although a perceived

cause of death may be a certain event, often an underlying
disease can also be correctly termed a "cause" of death
because of a direct physiological causal link between the
underlying disease and the event.46
Although Judge Cornaby stated that this situation is
analogous

to

the

sequence

of

events

leading

to

Mrs.

Draughon's death, the analogy only holds true if one begins
the sequence with Mrs. Draughon's pancreatitis.

That is,

although the pancreatitis was the "common perception of the
resulting death," Mrs. Draughon died of cardiac arrest.47
45

Id.

46

For example, the underlying disease arteriosclerosis
causes a thickening and hardening of arterial walls, which in
turn causes restricted and, eventually, blocked circulation,
which in turn causes the event cardiac arrest.
47

Deposition transcript of Dr. Wayne A. Border at 31.
27

The analogy fails if the sequence begins with Mrs. Draughon's
kidney

disease

because

of

the

lack

of

physiological

causation.
In short, the lack of physiological causation compels
the conclusion that Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was not a
"material contributing cause" of her death.

In reaching the

opposite result, Judge Cornaby misconstrued and misapplied
the Oregon interpretation and thereby erred.
CONCLUSION
The sole issue before Judge Cornaby was whether Sandra
Draughon/s kidney disease was a "material contributing cause"
of her death.

The analysis necessary to decide the issue had

two facets - the determination of the meaning of the phrase
and the application of that meaning to the facts.
In determining
phrase

provided

that an Oregon interpretation of the

the

relevant

meaning,

Judge

Cornaby

implicitly decided that the phrase is not ambiguous.
Draughon assigns its first error to this decision.

Mr.

Lacking

any relevant definition, the phrase should have been found
ambiguous and, pursuant to the rules of construction, it
should have been construed against its drafter, CUNA.

Mr.

Draughon requests that this court reverse Judge Cornaby's
ruling dated April 9, 1987, on the grounds that the phrase is
ambiguous and should have been construed in favor of Mr.
28

Draughon pursuant to the construction urged below and on
appeal.
Mr.

Draughon

next assigns

error to Judge

Cornaby's

decision to apply the Oregon interpretation of the phrase to
the facts of this case.

The legal and factual setting of the

present matter does not conform with that in which the Oregon
courts apply the phrase.

Furthermore, the parties did not

intend that the phrase be construed according to an Oregon
interpretation.

Mr. Draughon requests that this court find

the Oregon interpretation inapplicable and, on that basis,
reverse Judge Cornaby's ruling dated April 9, 1987.
Mr. Draughon's third assignment of error involves the
construction of the Oregon interpretation by Judge Cornaby
and the application of that construction to the facts. Judge
Cornaby

failed

to

perceive

the

nature

of

the

causal

connection essential to the Oregon interpretation of the
phrase.

As

a

result,

he

misconstrued

the

Oregon

interpretation and misapplied it to the facts. Assuming this
court

finds

the

Oregon

interpretation

applicable,

Mr.

Draughon requests (1) that it find that properly construed
and applied, the Oregon interpretation mandates a finding in
his favor; and that (2) on the basis of its misconstruction
and application, Judge Cornaby committed reversible error.
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DATED:

August 2*v.

1987.
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING

A

^\^^\,^«

Craig G. Adamson
Eric P. Lee
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND FOR THE

1307 APR 10 RJ 3: 55

County of Davis, State of U t a h

^^v^^.W™

3Y__. A/t._l__
RON DRAUGHON,

)

Plaintiff,

)

VS.

RULING ON MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY,

)

Defendant.

)

Civil No. 39545

The plaintiff's and defendant's motions for summary judgment
came before

the Court on March 31, 1987.

The plaintiff was

represented by Craig G. Adamson and the defendant was represented
by Lewis B. Quigley.

After oral argument, the Court took the

motions under advisement.

The court now rules on the motions for

summary judgment.
The material

facts in this matter

are undisputed.

Mrs.

Sandra Draughon suffered from kidney disease first diagnosed in
1982.

The condition was successfully treated with maintenance

hemodialysis

and,

aside

from

normal

side

effects

of

the

hemodialysis, Mrs. Draughon led a normal, productive life.
In October of 1985, the plaintiff and Mrs. Draughon, now
deceased, entered into a loan agreement under which they borrowed
funds to

purchase

an

Union in Ogden, Utah.

automobile

through

America

First

Credit

As part of that transaction the America

First Credit Union obtained credit life insurance from defendant
CUNA Mutual Insurance Society for the benefit of the plaintiff
and his wife.
In November

of

1985, Mrs. Draughon elected to undergo a

kidney transplant operation, which if successful, would allow her
to live free of hemodialysis and its side effects.

Complications

FILMED
A-2

arose following the operation, requiring Mrs. Draughon to remain
hospitalized until her death on February 7, 1987. She developed
acute pancreatitis, resulting from steroid drugs required as an
immunosuppressive.
Pancreatitis is a rare and uncommon,
infrequent complication of taking steroids and was not a foreseen
complication of which Mrs. Draughon was advised prior to
undergoing surgery, yet was the ultimate cause of her death.
Plaintiff submitted a claim to CUNA Mutual Insurance Society
under the life insurance policy obtained as described above.
Defendant denied the claim, stating that the death of Sandra L.
Draughon came under the "risks not assumed" clause of the policy.
Given these undisputed facts, the legal issue remains:
Whether Mrs. Draughonfs death resulted from factors which fall
within the "risks not assumed" clause of the insurance policy.
The clause states, in pertinent part:
CUNA Mutual does not assume the risk and no
benefit is provided for any loss if any material
contributing cause of loss was from sickness or
injury which first became manifest prior to the
time insurance coverage was otherwise effective
under the Contract.
Interpreting this clause in light of the facts requires that
the Court determine whether Mrs. Draughon*s kidney disease, which
existed at the effective date of the insurance contract, was a
"material contributing cause" of her death.
This phrase has not been interpreted by a Utah Court before
arid there is little precedent in other jurisdictions on this
exact issue. The Appeals Court of Oregon addressed the issue in
Manous vs. Argonaut Insurance, 79 Or.App. 645, 719 P. 2d 1318
(1986). This case interpreted the phrase "material contributing
cause" in light of Oregon's workmen's compensation law. Under
this law, the employee has the burden of proving that an original
injury is a "material contributing cause" of a present
compensable injury. The court stated that "a compensable injury
need not be the sole or principal cause of claimant's worsened

A-3

condition," it need only be a material cause.
id. at 1320.
Although other intervening forces act upon the original
condition, the original condition is a material contributing
factor of the final injury.
Applying this interpretation to the present facts, kidney
disease was a "material contributing cause" of Mrs. Draughon1s
death. If not for her kidney disease, Mrs. Draughon would not
have elected to undergo a kidney transplant. If she had not had
the kidney transplant, she would not have been given steroid
drugs which caused acute pancreatitis, which ultimately caused
her death. The original condition was kidney disease, which was
a material factor in causing her death.
Acute pancreatitis resulting from a kidney transplant cannot
be equated with intervening factors such as an automobile
striking a cancer patient walking to the hospital to receive
radiation therapy. In such a case, it is clear that the cancer
would not be a "material contributing cause" of the patient's
death.
As a practical matter, patients often do not die from their
underlying illness; arteriosclerosis victims die of cardiac
arrest and AIDS victims die of pneumonia, yet in those cases, the
common perception of the resulting death is the underlying
disease.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Fuller vs. Director of Finance,
694 p.2d 1045 (Utah 1985), stated:
In interpreting insurance policies, we have held
that ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer and that words are to be given their ordinary
meaning. An insured is entitled to the broadest protection reasonably understood to be provided by the
policy.
The plaintiff and his now deceased wife entered into the
life insurance contract less than one month prior to Mrs.
Draughon!s kidney transplant, which she had been considering for
some time. It seems reasonable that upon interpreting the "risks

A-4

not assumed" clause, the plaintiff reasonably understood that it
included Mrs, Draughon's kidney disease and any complications
arising out of a transplant operation related to that disease.
The ordinary meaning of the phrase "material contributing cause"
has been applied to the facts underlying the plaintiff's claim,
which CUNA Mutual Insurance Society properly denied.
No genuine issues of material fact exist, therefore,
pursuant to Rule 56 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant's
motion for judgment is granted. Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment is denied.
Dated April 9, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Craig G. Adamson, 310
South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and Lewis B.
Quigley, Suite 133 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101 en April 10, 1987.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
RON DRAUGHON,
AFFIDAVIT OF DR.
WAYNE A. BORDER

Plaintiff,
V.

C i v i l No. 39545

CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY,
Defendant.
oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Dr.

Wayne A. Border, being first duly sworn upon oath,

deposes and states:
1.

I have personal knowledge of all facts stated in this

affidavit.
2.

I

am Chief

of the Division

of Nephrology and

Hypertension at the University of Utah Medical Center.
3.

I was Sandra L. Draughon1s last attending physician

before her death on February 7, 1986.

Dr. Martin C. Gregory was

her attending physician at the time of death.
4.

Mrs. Draughon suffered from chronic renal failure due to
1
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reflux nephropathy (kidney disease) first diagnosed in September
of 1982.
5.

This condition was successfully treated with maintenance

hemodialysis.

In fact, Mrs. Draughon did remarkably well on

hemodialysis and lead a normal, productive life including full
employment.

She

could

have

continued

with

this

treatment

indefinitely.
6.

In November of 1985, Mrs. Draughon elected to undergo a

kidney transplant

operation.

The operation was successfully

performed on November 21, 1985.
7.

Following the operation, Mrs. Draughon developed acute

pancreatitis,

an

operations and

unusual

complication

of

immunosuppressive treatment.

kidney

transplant

Ultimately, this

complication, not her kidney disease, caused Mrs. Draughon's
death.
8.

The pancreatitis developed by Mrs. Draughon was in no

way related to her kidney disease.
9.

Mrs.

Draughon's

decision

to

undergo

a

kidney

transplantation was purely elective and not necessitated by the
presence

of

kidney

disease.

Thus,

her

death

caused

by

pancreatitis following the surgery was in no way connected with
her pre-existing condition.

2
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DATED this ^>Q

day of December, 1986.

C1^^^ ^
WaynerA. Border, M.D.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Jfc —

day of

December, 1986,
Notary P u b l i c / > .
R e s i d i n g a t : •\ZjL<lf

My Commission Expires:

draughon.aff
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Lewis B. Quigley, USB No. 2669
Matthew J. Storey, USB No. 4678
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-3627
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RON DRAUGHON,
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. ROBERT E. BOND
Plaintiff,

vs.
CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY,
Civil No. 39545
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
SS,

COUNTY OF
Having been first duly sworn, Affiant deposes and says:
1.

I am a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State

of Utah, specializing in internai medicine and nephrology.
2.

I presently serve as Chief of Nephrology, LDS Hospital.

3.

I have reviewed the medical records of Mrs. Sandra Draughon

pertaining to her kidney disease and death in February of 1986.

These

records contain the following information:
(a)

Mrs. Draughon was a 33 year old woman with end-stage

renal disease, secondary to chronic reflux pyelonephritis.
(b)

She was admitted to the University of Utah Hospital

on November 21, 1985, for placement of a cadaveric renal graft.
A-9

FILMED

(c)

She developed acute rejection of the graft and a

transplant nephrectomy was performed approximately one week
after the initial transplant.
(d)

An abdominal exploration at the time of the kidney

transplant showed hemorrhagic pancreatitis to be present and
from that time on she had multiple problems and complications
secondary to infections and hemorrhagic pancreatitis that
ultimately led to her death in early February of 1986.
(e)

She received Prednisone in conjunction with her

transplant operation.
4.

Administration of Prednisone in high doses can lead to acute

pancreatitis.
5.

Pancreatitis is an uncommon, but not unknown complication
^

associated with kidney transplantation.
6.

/

Pancreatitis was a complication that'^occurred as a result

of the treatment that was done for Sandra Draughon's primary underlying renal disease.
7.

Pancreatitis is an uncommon complication of kidney trans-

plantation.

Pancreatitis was a-complication that in all probability

occurred as a result of the treatment that was done for Sandra
Draughon's primary, underlying disease.
8.

It is extremely unlikely that Mrs. Draughon would have

developed acute pancreatitis had not the transplant surgery been
done and the transplant surgery was done because of her renal disease.
DATED this fg/i

day of

7 ^ ^ ^

1

# 1987.

sT/C**r *? 2?<mJ.w o.

ROBERT E . BOND, M.D.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e me by ROBERT E . BOND, M . D . ,

/ / • ^ d a y of

3?<^^

,

this

1987.
/
S:<

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing atj;

y.y

S>;

My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of March, 1987, I mailed
a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DR. ROBERT E.
BOND, postage prepaid, to the attorney for Plaintiff:
Mr. Craig G. Adamson
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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